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nographer, but not by the defendant.
The child was openly frightened of
the defendant, therefore, the judge
concluded that the child was not
emotionally prepared to testify in
open court before the defendant.
Accordingly, the judge decided that
a two-way television should be used
in such a way that both the child and
the defendant could see one another
without actual confrontation.
Gilbert's motion fora new trial was
denied and he received a fifteen year
prison sentence. Craig, 588 A.2d at
336. Gilbert appealed, but before
the court of special appeals had an
opportunity to decide the case, the
court of appeals issued a writ of
certiorari. Id. at 337.
The defendant claimed that the
trial judge erred in permitting the
section 9-1 02 procedure without first
examining the child victim testifying in the presence.ofthe defendant.
Id. at 338. Nevertheless, the court
of appeals upheld the trial court
judge's findings, basing its decision
on two rationales: (1) the trial court
judge did not have the guidance of
Craig I nor Maryland v. Craig,
which favors the initial interview in
front of the defendant; and (2) the
court ruled that it was within the
trial court judge's discretion whether
or not to allow the defendant to be
present. Id. at 338-39.
In summary, Gilbert's case was
decided differently than Craig's
due to the trial court judge's personal examination of the child prior
to her testifying. The judge made a
case-specific finding, and concluded
that the child was unable to testify in
open court without subjecting herselfto serious emotional trauma. Id.
at 339.
Craig and Gilbert established a
set of guidelines, not a rigid formula, for trial court judges to follow
in child abuse cases. The ruling in
Craig leaves a tremendous amount

of discretion in the hands ofthe trial
court judge. Gilbert indicates that
so long as the trial judge makes an
individualized evaluation of the
child's emotional health, his or her
decision to implement section 9102 will be upheld. These cases
demonstrate an effort to provide further guidelines in child abuse cases,
and in so doing, the court ofappeals
has pushed the right of confrontation to its constitutional limits in an
all out effort to protect abused children.
- Andrew S. Kasmer
Board of Oklahoma City v.
Dowell: FEDERAL COURT
SUPERVISION OF PREVIOUSL Y SEGREGATED
SCHOOLS MAY BE TERMINATED IF SUBSTANTIAL
COMPLIANCE WITH DESEGREGATION OBJECTIVES HAS BEEN ATTAINED
In Board of Oklahoma City v.
Dowell, 111 S. Ct. 630 (1991), the
United States Supreme Court promulgated a standard for dissolving
desegregation decrees. Specifically,
the Court ruled that a federal district
court may lift a desegregation decree if a school district can show
that it has complied with the decree
in good faith and that vestiges of
past discrimination have been eliminated to the extent practicable. If a
decree is to be terminated or dissolved, the parties are entitled to a
detailed statement to that effect from
the court.
In 1972, the Board of Education
of Oklahoma City was ordered to
adopt a court-supervised desegregation plan involving busing. This
plan was designed to integrate the
schools in its district and end de jure
segregation. After complying with
the desegregation decree for five
years, the Board moved in 1977 to
end court supervision of the plan.
After finding that the Board had

substantially complied with the constitutional requirements and that lack
of court supervision would not be
detrimental to the unitary system
the Board had achieved, the district
court terminated its jurisdiction in
the case.
In 1984, the Board adopted the
Student Reassignment Plan (SRP).
This plan was designed to alleviate
greater burdens placed on blackchildren caused by demographic changes
in the area that resulted in longer
busing routes. In 1985, the respondents, black students and their parents, asked the district court to reopen the case, contending that the
school district had not achieved ''unitary" status and that SRP was a
return to segregation. Id. at 634.
The district court refused to re-open
the case, holding that its 1977 finding that the school system was ''unitary" was res judicata and that the
school system had remained unitary. Id. The Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit reversed, and held
thatthe 1977 orderdidnotterminate
the original injunction. Id.
The court of appeals remanded
the case for the district court to
determine if the injunction should
be lifted or modified. On remand,
the district court vacated the injunction because it found that the previously ordered desegregation plan
was unworkable dueto demographic
changes, the school district had
maintained its unitary status, and
that the SRP was not designed with
discriminatory intent. Id. at 634-35.
The Court of Appeals again reversed. Id. at 635. Relying on
United States v. Swift, 286 U.S. 106
(1932), the court ruled that the injunction should remain in effect until
the school district could show that
its existence was causing a "grievous wrong evoked by new and unforeseen conditions." Dowell, 111
S. Ct. at 635 (quoting Swift, 286

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 22.//fhe Law Forum - 29

U.S. at 119 (1932». The Supreme
Court granted the Board's petition
for certiorari and reversed.
In the majority opinion written
by ChiefJustice Rehnquist, the Court
first considered whether the respondents could contest the 1977 order
disso 1ving the desegregation decree.
The Board argued that the 1977
finding ofunitariness barred the respondents from challenging the order. Id. at 635. Because the lower
courts inconsistently used the term
''unitary,'' confusion arose in interpreting the 1977 order. As a result,
the Court held that when a desegregation decree is to be terminated, all
parties are "entitled to a rather precise statement" to that effect from
the court. Id. at 636.
In its analysis, the Court focused
on the standard for dissolving desegregation decrees and placed great
weight on the nature of injunctions
issued in desegregation cases. In
distinguishing the nature ofthe Swift
injunction on which the court of
appeals had relied, the Court recognized that "federal supervision of
local school systems was intended
as a temporary measure to remedy
past discrimination." Id. at 637.
Accordingly, the Court found that
dissolution standards, which applied
to other injunctions that were designed to operate in perpetuity, were
not the proper standards to apply to
desegregation decrees that were temporary by their very nature. Id.
The Court held that after local
authorities had complied with the
desegregation decree for a "reasonable period of time," the decree's
dissolution was proper. Id. In determining a school district's compliance with desegregation decrees, the
court first must conclude that the
school board had "complied in good
faith with the desegregation decree
since it was entered." Id. at 638.
In deciding the question of good
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faith, "compliance with previous
court orders is obviously relevant."
Id. at 637. In this case, the Board
complied with the decree from 1972
until 1985. The Court held, therefore, that the court of appeals had
erred in relying on United States v.
W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629
(1953), for the proposition that
"compliance alone cannot become
the basis for modifying or dissolving an injunction." Dowell, 111 S.
Ct. at 637. The Court also recognized that the "grievous wrong" test,
which the court of appeals gleaned
from Swift, would place school
boards under judicial supervision
indefinitely. Id. at 638. This result
conflicted with the purpose ofschoo 1
desegregation injunctions, which
sought only to remedy past segregation, prevent future discrimination,
and ultimately return schools to local control. Id.
Next, the Court instructed lower
courts to determine if the "vestiges
of past discrimination had been
eliminated to the extent practicable."
Id. In evaluating this criteria, the
Court stated that consideration must
be given not only to student assignments, but also to "every facet of
school operations - faculty, staff,
transportation, extra-curricular activities and facilities." Id. (quoting
Green v. New Kent County School
Board, 391 U.S. 430,435 (1968».
On remand, the Court instructed
the district court to determine (1) if
the Board had complied in good
faith with the desegregation decree
since its imposition and (2) if the
vestiges of past discrimination had
been eliminated as far as practicable
throughout every facet ofthe school
district's operations. If the district
court found that the Board was entitled to have the injunction lifted, it
must then proceed to evaluate the
SRPunderthemandatesoftheEqual
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment. [d.
In dissent, Justice Marshall,
joined by Justices Blackmun and
Stevens, sought a stricter standard
than the majority for ending court
supervised desegregation. Drawing
on Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483 (1954), the dissenters
argued that a decree should not be
lifted while conditions likely to inflict the type of stigma identified in
Brown still remained. So long as
"racially identifiable schools" and
other conditions likely to inflict such
injury persisted, and while at the
same timethere were feasible means
of eliminating them, the dissenters
would not terminate desegregation
decrees. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 639
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
The decision in Board ofEducation ofOklahoma City v. Dowell set
down standards for dissolution of
desegregation decrees, thus making
it easier for school districts currently under supervision to be set on
their own again. Under the new
standards, a school system that was
at one time segregated and subject
to a desegregation order may have
that order terminated upon a showing that it has complied with the
order in good faith for a "reasonable
period oftime," has abandoned any
discriminatory practices to the extent "practicable," and that it is unlikely that the school system would
again resort to discriminatory practices.
- Robert D. Cole Jr.
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